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Abstract 
This paper aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research, the 
structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically 
involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore 
metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds 
tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion 
that they have “essences”. The complexities are real enough, but they should not be 
allowed to obscure the way that kinds are typically unified by certain core properties. 
We shall show how this unifying role offers a natural account of why certain 
properties are metaphysically essential to kinds. 
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Essential Properties are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality
1 Introduction
Saul Kripke’s examples of a posteriori necessities in Naming and Necessity revived the 
traditional distinction between the essential and accidental properties of things. 
Kripke was content, however, to leave this distinction on an intuitive basis. As a 
result, many philosophers still view metaphysically essential properties with 
suspicion, once the trivial cases of self-identity are put to one side (e.g. Sidelle 1989, 
Mackie 2006, Divers 2007).
In this paper we want to offer a principled basis for Kripke’s distinction. In our view, 
super-explanatory properties lie behind all the non-trivial Kripkean a posteriori 
necessities. These are properties that explain the many shared features of things, and 
we argue that this makes them metaphysically necessary to those things. Super-
explanatory properties thus provide a bridge between the actual world and the 
modal realm. Their status derives from their playing a certain causal role in the actual 
world, but because of this status they are held constant across all possible worlds.
In this paper we shall concentrate on the metaphysically necessary properties of 
natural kinds. But we believe the idea of super-explanatoriness applies more 
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generally. At the end of the paper we shall briefly indicate how it also promises to 
account for the essential properties of particular objects like people and lecterns.
Philosophers of science who work on natural kinds have tended to emphasize their 
complexity and lack of sharp boundaries. Because of this, they are generally resistant 
to any suggestion that kinds have “essences”, viewing such thinking as grounded in 
outmoded metaphysics. (See e.g. Hull 1965, Sober 1980, Wilson et al. 2007, 
Häggqvist and Wikforss 2018.) We agree that natural kinds are complex, but will 
show that even so they are typically unified by certain super-explanatory core 
properties, which are thus naturally viewed as essences. While other philosophers 
have noted that causal mechanisms are needed to explain the unity of natural kinds 
(Boyd 1991, 1999, Craver 2000, Khalidi 2013), they have failed to appreciate how this 
role is typically played by single super-explanatory properties. 
2 Kinds
Some categories have a rich structure, in that their instances share a great many 
properties. 
For example, all horses are alike, not only in being horses, but in eating grass, 
growing manes, having uncloven hooves, and sharing a great number of other 
behavioural, anatomical and physiological features. 
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Following J.S. Mill, we shall call this sort of category a “Kind”.1 The defining 
characteristic of Kinds is that any Kind K will enter into a plurality of informative 
synthetic generalizations of the form: All K are G.2
Note that by no means all properties pick out Kinds. For example, square things, or 
soft things, or small things, do not form Kinds. There are no informative 
generalizations of the form: All square/soft/small things are G.
Higher biological taxa, as well as species, also form Kinds. For example, all mammals 
have fur, sweat glands, milk glands, and other distinctive anatomical features. Note 
how the features common to some higher taxon will be a subclass of those common 
to its subordinate taxa. The features common to all mammals are among the features 
common to all horses.
Biological categories are not the only Kinds. Chemical substances are also Kinds. All 
samples of sulphuric acid have the same melting and boiling point, the same 
1 As Mill put it “The class horse is a Kind, because the things which agree in possessing the 
characters by which we recognise a horse, agree in a great number of other properties as we 
know, and, it cannot be doubted, in many more than we know” (1843: 703-4).
2 Our requirement for informativeness is that K should not logically entail G. Some Kinds are 
thinner than others, in supporting fewer generalizations. But any Kind supporting a plurality 
of generalizations is worthy of note. The generalizations associated with many Kinds, 
especially biological taxa and social categories, admit of exceptions. 
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propensity to combine with other substances in fixed proportions, the same liquid 
density, electrical and thermal conductivity, and so on.
Astronomical objects also fall into Kinds. All main sequence stars (those powered by 
hydrogen fusion) are spherical, in hydrostatic equilibrium, radiate energy of certain 
wavelengths, and so on. Other astronomical Kinds include red giant stars, white 
dwarf stars and supernovae. Further types of Kinds include meteorological categories 
and geological formations.
3 Kinds are Useful but not Anthropocentric
The rich structure of Kinds makes them very useful to human beings. 
For one thing, we can normally ascertain that something is an instance of some Kind 
K by observing just one, or some few, of its characteristic Gs. For example, you can 
reliably identify horses by the characteristic shape of their heads, or gold by its 
characteristic electrical conductivity. And then, if you are appropriately informed, you 
can infer all the other characteristic Gs from this.
For another thing, there are often short-cuts to becoming appropriately informed 
about the Gs that are characteristic of some Kind. This is because Kinds fall into 
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Types that specify which properties will be shared by all the instances of Kinds of that 
Type. 
So, for example, vertebrate species are one Type of Kind, in that all the animals in any 
given vertebrate species will share morphology, anatomy, physiology, diet, 
reproductive behaviour, and various other properties (but not injuries, or learned 
behaviours, for example.) Of course, the determinate morphology, anatomy, and so 
on, of any one vertebrate species will be different from that of the others; still, the 
different vertebrate species will all coincide in each being characterised by 
determinates of the same set of d terminable properties.
Similarly, chemical substances are another Type of Kind. All samples of any given 
chemical substance in a given state of matter will typically have the same colour, 
taste, odour, density, electrical and thermal conductivity, and so on (but not, for 
example, the same shape, or size.)
If you know the “template” of determinable properties for a certain Type of Kind, as 
Ruth Millikan has put it (2000: ch. 1.8), then you are in a position to make one-shot 
inductions. From a traditional perspective, it can seem puzzling that one experiment 
on one piece of gold can tell you about the electrical conductivity of all gold, or that 
one dissection of a hippopotamus can tell you about all hippopotamus bladders. 
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However, once you know the template for chemical substances, or for vertebrates, 
then these inferences are secure. 
All in all, then, facts about Kinds are very useful to humans who want to make 
inductive inferences. But it should not be thought that Kinds somehow come into 
existence in order to serve the inductive interests of humans. Rather, the Kinds first 
have their structure, and then humans use this structure to help them find their way 
around the world.3 Most Kinds would exist even if no humans or other intelligent 
beings had ever evolved to base inferences on them. (Indeed it is likely that many of 
our distinctive intellectual powers evolved specifically to enable us to discern the 
pre-existing structure of Kinds.)
Later we shall have occasion to observe that entities like works of literature and 
social groups are also Kinds. Such entities do depend on humans for their existence. 
But the basic point remains. They aren’t constituted in order to serve the inferential 
purposes of humans. It’s just that their structure lends itself to these inferential 
purposes once they do exist.
4 Super-Explanatory Properties
3 Of course, our interests will determine which Kinds we attend to, and moreover will often 
direct our attention to categories that are not Kinds at all (cf. Dupre 1993).
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When we have a Kind K whose instances share many different properties G, there will 
typically be some single property E of their instances that causally explains this 
multiple commonality. Our eventual aim in this paper is to show that such “super-
explanatory” properties are also essential in the modal sense of being possessed by 
Kind instances across all possible worlds. But that is for later. Our first task is to 
explain the role of super-explanatory properties in the actual world.
For example, the atomic constitution of gold explains why all samples of solid gold 
have the same density, electrical and thermal conductivity, melting and boiling point, 
and so on. More generally, the molecular constitution of any given chemical 
substance will explain why its instances share many corresponding properties.4
Similarly, the internal physical constitutions characteristic of the various Kinds of 
astronomical objects explain why the instances of such Kinds (the main-sequence 
4 More precisely, it is the microstructure consequent on molecular composition that accounts 
for the shared properties of chemical substances; accordingly, we shall understand citation of 
chemical formulae like “H2O” as shorthand for the relevant microstructures; this is in line with 
the system of nomenclature developed by the International Union of Pure and Applied 
Chemistry (see Hendry 2016, Weisberg et al. 2019, esp. sect. 4.5). Some further 
complications: it is molecular structure, not chemical formula, that explains the properties of 
chemical compounds (isomers can be very different from each other); isotopy makes a 
difference to some (but not all) of the properties of elements and compounds; some 
chemical mixtures are Kinds in their own right. A rich literature explores the complexity of 
chemical and other natural Kinds (inter alia Hendry 2006, Needham 2008, Chang 2012, 
Khalidi 2013, Häggqvist and Wikforss 2018). We take this literature to show that there are 
more Kinds than you might initially suppose, often nested within each other, each with their 
own super-explainers for their shared properties. 
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stars, the white dwarfs, the red giants, and so on) share their many other common 
properties.
Moreover, as we shall see, the members of any given biological taxa will also share a 
single property that explains their multiple commonalities – though in the biological 
case, we shall argue, this will not be a shared intrinsic property, as it is with chemical 
or astronomical Kinds.
We can view such “super-explanatory” properties as illustrations of the Principle of 
the Common Cause. In general, when we find that some A and B are correlated (in 
the sense that they are co-instantiated more often than we would expect given their 
separate probabilities of occurrence), then it will be the case that either A causes B, 
or B causes A, or both A and B are joint results of some common cause. 
Kinds are in effect rich complexes of correlations. All the many Gs characteristic of a 
Kind are correlated with each other. As soon as we know that something has one 
such G, this typically makes all the other Gs much more likely. However, at least in 
the cases we have considered so far, the different correlated Gs don’t cause each 
other. The melting point of gold doesn’t cause its density. The bladders of 
hippopotami don’t cause their ears. So correlations between properties like these 
must be due to some single common cause, some super-explanatory property of the 
instances that is responsible for their all sharing so many other properties.
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Some doubt that the Principle of the Common Cause can be defended in any general 
form (Arntzenius 2010). We disagree, but need not pursue the issue here. The more 
important point is that Kinds typically have super-explanatory cores, not whether this 
fact can be derived from some exceptionless principle. 
So for us Kinds are any categories whose instances display multiple commonalities. A 
super-explanatory property for such a Kind is then a single property that causes all 
the other shared properties. Such causal powers will perforce be conditional, 
depending on laws of nature and possibly normal background circumstances, in 
addition to the super-explanatory property itself. Still, as long as a single property, 
plus such conditions, accounts for all the other shared properties of a Kind, we will 
count it as super-explanatory.
5 The Structure of Kinds
Do all Kinds have super-explanatory properties? Functional Kinds are one interesting 
case. Consider the Kind aerial insectivore. All the swallows, martins, swifts, 
insectivorous bats, and other flying insect-eaters share a range of properties, 
including acute sensory systems, ability to swoop, and pointed beaks or mouths. 
Kinds like this are the result of convergent evolution. The aerial insectivores all 
belong to species that have been shaped by similar selective pressures.
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Some are suspicious of Functional Kinds, on the grounds that they only share a few 
superficial properties, by comparison with the multitude of properties shared by the 
members of any biological taxon.5 While this is certainly true, and indeed a point to 
which we shall return below, we are happy to accept Functional Kinds as genuine 
Kinds, albeit of limited informativeness. In line with this, we would say that the 
common selective pressures that give rise to Functional Kinds are themselves a 
super-explanatory comm n cause for the shared properties of those Kinds.6
We don’t completely want to rule out Kinds that don’t in any sense have a super-
explanatory core property. Maybe there are Kinds where the shared Gs do cause each 
other, rather than stemming from some common cause. Perhaps some 
meteorological categories are like this. (For example, tropical cyclones might be seen 
as occurring when strong winds, heavy rain, spiralling thunderstorms and a low-
pressure centre all reciprocally reinforce each other; cf. Millikan 2017: ch. 1. Relatedly, 
psychiatric disorders like depression are arguably sustained by feedback between 
different symptoms; cf. Borsboom 2017.)
5 Thus biologists typically attach more weight to homologies between traits with a common 
ancestry than to analogies resulting from common evolutionary pressures (Brigandt and 
Griffiths 2007; Godman 2015).
6 Perhaps artefacts (like cars, as opposed to makes and models like Vauxhall and Zafira) also 
form Kinds, with their common features stemming from the shared intentions of their 
makers. 
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As with Functional Kinds, one might feel that there is something rather thin about 
Kinds like tropical cyclones, or depression, that gain their common properties from 
cycles of reciprocal causation. We shall not push this point, however. None of our 
arguments will depend on the claim that all Kinds have instances that share some 
super-explanatory property. Rather, we are interested specifically in analysing those 
Kinds that do have super-explanatory properties. If there are Kinds which lack such a 
property, so be it. They are not our focus in this paper.
On Richard Boyd’s influential account (1991, 1999), natural kinds are “homeostatic 
property clusters”. We certainly agree that Kinds are property clusters, in the sense 
that their instances share many properties. But we disagree with his emphasis on 
homeostasis in the sense of self-regulating feedback mechanisms. Perhaps the 
clustering of properties in a few special kinds—tropical cyclones, depression—is due 
to some such self-equilibrating homeostatic mecha ism. But there is in general 
nothing homeostatic about the way that microstructures give rise to the shared 
properties of chemical substances. Nor will the account of biological Kinds 
developed in the section after next appeal to homeostasis in any way.
Points like these have led a number of authors to argue that Boyd’s analysis should 
be replaced by a “simple casual account” of natural kinds (Craver 2009, Khalidi 2013). 
On this view, the clustering of properties in any natural kind will be due to some 
causal structure, but this need not involve any homeostatic process. We agree with 
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this turn away from homeostatic mechanisms, but we feel that an undifferentiated 
appeal to causal structure misses the widespread significance of super-explanatory 
properties. In our view, the great preponderance of natural kinds owe their clustering 
of properties, not just to some causal structure or other, but to one single underlying 
property that serves as the common cause of all the other clustered properties. 
For completeness, it is worth observing that some categories technically fit our 
definition of Kinds, in supporting a plurality of generalizations, even though there is 
no unified explanation for the correlations involved, not in terms of any causal 
structure. For example, jadeite and nephrite are traditionally lumped together as jade, 
on account of their similar colour, hardness and density, even though they are two 
quite different minerals (cf. Bird 2010). We shall say that a Kind is genuine if its 
correlations have a unified causal explanation, and ersatz when it results from two or 
more genuine Kinds fortuitously coinciding in some of their properties. Since ersatz 
Kinds are by their nature rare, depending on a lucky coincidence of properties in 
different genuine Kinds, we shall put them to one side in what follows. It might seem 
odd to count ersatz Kinds as Kinds at all, but nothing will hang on this in what 
follows, since our focus henceforth will be exclusively on Kinds who instances do 
share a single super-explanatory property.
To summarize our taxonomy, then: any category supporting a plurality of 
generalizations is a Kind; only those for which this clustering has a unified causal 
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explanation are genuine; for most but not necessarily all genuine Kinds, that 
explanation involves a super-explanatory common cause.
6 Historical and Eternal Kinds
Consider a rather different type of Kind from those discussed so far – all the different 
copies of Alice in Wonderland. This qualifies as a Kind. The copies share a multitude 
of properties. Each copy tells the same story, with the same characters and scenes. 
Indeed they all tell it in the same way, with the same first word, the same second 
word, and so on, until the end.
The car model Vauxhall Zafira forms another Kind. All cars of this model have the 
same ingenious system of extra folding seats, the same undercar spare wheel holder, 
the same type of carburettor, and so on.
The correlations between the properties of these Kinds are not explainable by some 
common internal physical property, like molecular structure or stellar composition. 
Different copies of Alice in Wonderland can be physically quite different (paper, 
magnetic tape, and so on). And even if all Zafiras are physically similar, there is no 
one aspect of this similarity that provides a common explanation for all the other 
shared properties of Zafiras.
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Rather, the super-explanatory feature shared by the members of these Kinds is their 
common origin. All the many instances of Alice in Wonderland have been reproduced 
in one way or another from Lewis Carroll’s original manuscript. All the many Zafiras 
have been manufactured in line with the designer’s original blueprint. That’s why 
these instances all share a multitude of properties.
Ruth Millikan, from whom we have derived much of our general framework for 
thinking about Kinds, has coined the term “Historical” for Kinds whose shared 
properties are due to their instances all being copied from some common source 
(1999). She contrasts these with “Eternal” Kinds whose shared properties are 
explained by the instances having some common intrinsic physical property. (The 
term “Eternal” is perhaps not ideal, given that instances of Eternal Kinds can be in flux 
and short-lived – as with supernovae, say, or decaying elements – but we will stick 
with it.)
Literary works and car models might seem somewhat frivolous examples of Kinds. 
But consciously designed items like these are not the only Historical Kinds. Various 
types of social category can also be seen in this light: the many beliefs and 
behaviours characteristic of Christians, say, or molecular biologists, or Japanese 
women, are arguably shared because they are copied from prior models (cf. Godman 
2105, forthcoming; Ásta 2018). In addition, as we shall now argue, biological taxa are 
also Historical Kinds.     
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7 Biological Taxa
What sort of Kinds are biological taxa? A first thought might be that they are 
Functional Kinds, with their shared properties accounted for by common selective 
pressures. But this fails to do justice to the rich structure of biological taxa. The 
members of any biological taxon typically share a wealth of features that are not 
explainable by the selective pressures that shaped that taxon. This is because natural 
selection does not design ideal organisms, but builds on what went before, is limited 
to materials thrown up by mutation, and is buffeted around by genetic drift. This 
ensures that biological taxa standardly share any number of non-functional features. 
We need to look beyond selective pressures to capture the nature of biological taxa.
Michael Devitt (2008, 2010) has recently argued that we need to recognize intrinsic7 
biological “essences”, in the form of shared genomic material and associated 
developmental mechanisms, precisely in order to account for the many characteristic 
phenotypic commonalities displayed by the members of any given biological genus. 
(We have put “essences” in scare quotes to repeat the point that at this stage we are 
still not concerned with any modal issues, but simply with the explanatory role of 
genomic mechanisms in the actual world.)
7 For our purposes it will suffice to understand an “intrinsic” property of an entity as one that 
is metaphysically independent of the possession of other properties by other entities.
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Devitt’s position might suggest that we should assimilate biological taxa to Eternal 
Kinds, taking their shared genomes and developmental mechanisms to play the role 
of super-explanatory intrinsic properties. However, this is not the only possible way 
of fitting biological taxa into our analysis. An alternative option is to view biological 
reproduction and ontogeny as a copying mechanism which produces new members 
of biological taxa from old ones. This would then render biological taxa as Historical 
Kinds.
Does this have to be an either/or issue? The examples offered so far might have 
suggested that Eternal and Historical Kinds will always be mutually exclusive. We 
have considered Eternal Kinds, like chemical substances and stars, whose instances 
have had no causal connection to each other, but have simply arisen whenever the 
conditions were right. By contrast, the instances of Historical Kinds are necessarily 
causally connected to each other, related by descent through copying. 
Still, the definition of an Eternal Kind as having a common intrinsic core does not 
itself preclude its instances from being causally connected to each other. So it 
remains open that some Kinds could be both Eternal and Historical, in the sense that 
their instances share some common intrinsic property and reproduce by copying.
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Biological taxa could be a case in point. We could view them both ways. We could 
focus on the genomes and developmental mechanisms, and view reproduction as 
simply a part of the process which creates items with that intrinsic nature. Or we 
could focus instead on the reproduction, and view the genomes and development as 
simply a part of the process by which new instances are copied from old ones. The 
two perspectives are obviously compatible. This suggests that biological taxa are akin 
to both Eternal and Historical Kinds. 
We nevertheless want to argue that biological taxa should be counted as Historical 
and not Eternal Kinds. In an earlier paper (forthcoming), Godman and Papineau 
pointed out that (a) even in sexually reproducing taxa, a significant number of taxon-
typical biological characteristics are not inherited through the sexual bottleneck via 
intrinsic genetic properties of the zygote, but via non-genetic influences like 
behavioural imitation, and (b) in single-celled non-sexual taxa like bacteria, genomic 
material does not play any super-explanatory role, but is just one of the features 
copied in mitosis. On this basis, Godman and Papineau argued that a uniform 
account of biological taxa should treat them as Historical rather than Eternal Kinds.
It now strikes us, however, that there is a more fundamental objection to viewing 
biological taxa as Eternal Kinds. It’s not just that this position fails to deal with non-
genetic inheritance and non-sexual reproduction. Rather, even if we stick solely to 
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genetically inherited traits in sexual species, it never offers the right kind of super-
explanation at all.8
Remember that we are looking for some common-cause explanation of the multiple 
correlations between the many characteristic phenotypic features of biological 
genera. However, the genomic material common to the members of a taxon will 
typically not be suited to play this role. This is because it will normally be a 
conjunction of different genetic properties, each one of which explains a different 
phenotypic feature. So we don’t have one intrinsic property acting as a common 
cause for many phenotypic properties, but simply a list of different intrinsic genetic 
properties explaining different phenotypic properties. And this thus leaves us once 
more with an unexplained multiple correlation: why are all those different intrinsic 
genetic properties found together?
By way of comparison, note that it would not be much of an explanation of why all 
gold, say, has a distinctive colour, density, electrical and heat conductivity, and so on, 
to be told that gold contains an intrinsic property I1 that determines its colour, a 
different I2 that fixes its density, another I3 for its electrical conductivity, and another 
I4 for its heat conductivity, and so forth. This would give us no account of why all 
these intrinsic I-properties occur together in any sample of gold.
8 We would like to thank Nicholas Shea for this objection.
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By the same coin, it is no explanation of the many features common to all horses, 
say, to specify that horses all have some genetic material that determines manes, and 
some other genetic material that determines uncloven hooves, and some other 
genetic material that determines their head shape, and so on. We wouldn’t yet have 
explained why all these different genetic features are found together in horses.9
In the case of gold and other chemical substances, of course, it is molecular structure 
that provides the requisite common cause. The different features of gold all stem 
from one common source, its atomic structure, and not from a number of different 
intrinsic properties. But in the biological case the different genetic elements in some 
taxon’s genome are not tied together in this way.10
To find a property that explains why all the different phenotypic features of a 
biological taxon are instantiated together, we need to turn away from ontogenetic 
9 It might seem that this argument assumes a strong version of “bean-bag” genetics 
according to which genomes are composed of separate “genes” each of which 
independently determines some phenotype, when in truth different parts of genomes 
combine in complex ways in producing any given phenotype. Our argument only requires, 
however, that genomes display some level of modularity, and this much is widely agreed to 
be a prerequisite of evolution by natural selection. 
10 The trouble with taxon genomes as super-explainers is not that they are conjunctions of 
properties. Plenty of legitimate super-explainers, like molecular structures say, can be 
analysed as conjunctions of properties. Rather, the objection is that the conjunction of 
properties in a genome do not constitute a unified common cause that is responsible for 
each of the taxon’s characteristics Gs, and so fails to identify the source of their correlation. 
We would like to thank Julien Dutant for pressing us on this issue.
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development and view the taxon as a Historical Kind. The reason the phenotypic 
features of a taxon are found together is that its members are all descended from 
common ancestors who had those features. Biological reproduction is a copying 
process – offspring share the heritable features of their parents.11 So, a set of 
properties that is conjoined in an ancestral population will be found together in the 
descendants, too.
Note that nothing in our analysis requires biological taxa or other Historical Kinds to 
be immutable. Reproduction does not have to mean exact replication; and natural 
selection operating on so-introduced and pre-existing variation can lead to changes 
in the set of common characteristics displayed by a Kind. When this happens to a 
significant degree, then this will amount to emergence of a new Historical Kind, as 
most familiarly illustrated by the emergence of new species and other biological taxa.
One last point before turning to modal matters. Ernst Mayr introduced a well-known 
distinction between proximal and ultimate biological explanations (1961). A proximal 
explanation tells us how an individual organism ontogenetically develops the 
11 In sexual taxa, offspring are only partial copies of their parents, due to sexual dimorphism 
and the sexual mixing of traits. We shall take these complications as read when we refer to 
the members of a sexually reproducing taxon as being “copied” from a common source. 
With clones like Dolly the sheep, on the other hand, we do have full copies of parents. 
Sometimes people wonder whether such clones properly belong to the relevant biological 
species. That depends on exactly what hangs on “species membership”, but we would 
certainly count clones as belonging to the same Historical Kinds as the parents they are 
copied from.
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phenotypic features that are characteristic of its species. An ultimate explanation tells 
us why that species phylogenetically came to have those characteristics in the first 
place. Proximal explanations will refer to the developmental program that enables 
the zygote to develop into a mature organism. Ultimate explanations will appeal to 
the historical circumstances that shaped the species, including selective pressures.
Devitt explicitly relates his analysis to Mayr’s distinction. He observes that his intrinsic 
essences answer Mayr’s proximal question, in that they explain individual 
development in terms of genetic material and associated developmental 
mechanisms. He also responds to Mayr’s ultimate question, by adding a further 
historical element to biological essences. So Devitt’s overall view is that taxon 
essences are partly intrinsic and partly historic: the intrinsic component explains 
proximal issues of individual development, while the historic component explains 
ultimate issues of taxon origins (Devitt 2010).
It is worth making clear that our analysis of biological taxa is motivated by a question 
that is quite distinct from both of Mayr’s questions. Where he is interested in 
ontogeny and phylogeny, we are interested specifically in explaining why so many 
different properties are tightly correlated in the members of any given biological 
taxon, not in how those properties develop as those organisms mature from zygotes, 
nor in why the taxon came to have those properties in the first place.
Page 22 of 42
Cambridge University Press
Journal of the American Philosophical Association
For Review Only
23
It is clear enough that we are not addressing Mayr’s first proximal question. When we 
explain the clustering of a taxon’s properties in terms of the common ancestry of its 
members, we simply take developmental mechanisms for granted. We assume that 
offspring will resemble their parents, and use this to infer that all taxon members will 
share the properties that were originally displayed by the founding population. From 
our perspective, the development of mature organisms from fertilized zygotes is not 
explained, but rather presupposed as part of the copying mechanism that ensures 
the resemblance between parents and offspring (a resemblance, remember, that is 
differently accomplished in non-genetic inheritance and in non-sexual taxa).
Nor are we answering Mayr’s ultimate question. Even though our biological super-
explanatory properties are historical, they do nothing at all to address Mayr’s 
ultimate issue. By way of analogy, note that when we explain why all the copies of 
Alice in Wonderland, or all the Vauxhall Zafiras, share so many correlated properties, 
in terms of their all being copied from a common source, this doesn’t even start to 
explain why Alice and the Zafira were designed as they were in the first place. While 
these are certainly questions worth asking, they are not our present focus, and we do 
nothing to answer them. We simply take the features of the originals as given, and 
explain the commonalities in the copies by that alone. Similarly, when we explain why 
horses share so many common features, say, we start from the fact that some few 
original horses had those features, and explain the correlations by that alone, without 
wondering where those original features came from.
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So our question is different from both of the questions traditionally addressed by 
biological theorists. They are interested in ontogeny and phylogeny, where we are 
interested in explaining correlations. Moreover, our approach simply assumes 
answers to the traditional questions, taking as given both the machinery that allows 
offspring to resemble their parents, and the original traits of founding populations. 
Still, even if our question is not one that has traditionally concerned biological 
theorists, this does not mean it is not philosophically important in its own right. 
In this connection, note first that our correlational question is the one we need to 
focus on if we want to uncover some notion of “core property” that applies to Kinds 
in general, and not only to biological taxa. All Kinds involve correlations that call for 
explanation in terms of super-explanatory properties. But they do not all have 
ontogenies or phylogenies about which to ask Mayr’s proximate and ultimate 
questions. Chemical samples, for example, do not develop ontogenetically from 
seeds, nor do their shared properties result from evolutionary processes.
Moreover, as we are about to argue, it is specifically correlation-explaining super-
explanatory properties that hold the key to metaphysical modality. If we want a 
species of “essence” that is invariant across metaphysically possible worlds, we need 
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to focus on super-explanatory properties, rather than developmental machinery or 
evolutionary origins.
8 The Necessity of Super-Explanatoriness
 
We now turn to modal issues. A central thesis of this paper is that super-explanatory 
properties are metaphysically necessary.12
This proposal fits well with a range of common intuitions about which properties are 
metaphysically necessary to Kinds.
Take chemical substances. As we have seen, molecular structure plays the super-
explanatory role for chemical substances. In line with this, there is a widespread 
intuition that chemical substances have their molecular structure necessarily. The 
intuitive consensus is that there are no metaphysically possible worlds where water is 
not H2O, and moreover that, in any possible world, anything that is H2O is water.
12 Mallozzi 2018 also defends this assumption, and in particular explores its epistemological 
implications, focusing on examples of eternal Kinds. Kment 2014 is another who ties modal 
essences to explanation: however, for him this is part of a broader account of modality in 
terms of metaphysical laws, including ontological laws governing mereology and grounding; 
moreover, while Kment does appeal to causal considerations, he does not invoke the specific 
super-explanatory causal role that is our focus.
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It works similarly with biological taxa and other Historical Kinds. Here the super-
explanatory property is shared origin. Intuitions about necessary features are more 
disputed for biological than they are for chemical substances, but even so it seems 
natural enough to take origins to be essential to taxa: you can’t possibly be a tiger 
unless you are part of the lineage that starts with the original tigers, and necessarily 
anything that is part of that lineage (without too many modifications) is a tiger. 
Corresponding intuitions apply to Historical Kinds in general. For example, you can’t 
possibly be a copy of Alice in Wonderland if your provenance doesn’t trace back to 
Lewis Carroll’s original manuscript, and necessarily any reasonably faithful copy with 
such a provenance is a copy of Alice in Wonderland. 
As we said, Functional Kinds tend to be less rich than other Kinds. But once more it is 
not unnatural to regard the selective pressures that super-explain their shared 
properties as modally necessary and sufficient for Kind membership. You can’t 
possibly be an aerial insectivore unless natural selection has shaped you to catch 
insects, and necessarily anything so shaped is an aerial insectivore.13
We do not want to rest our case on intuitions, however. While we take our position 
to fit reasonably well with the intuitive judgements of both philosophers of modality 
and non-specialists, we attach more importance to the fact that our proposal also 
13 And artefacts will have the intentions behind them essentially. Necessarily something is a 
watch if and only if it has been designed to be a personal portable chronometer.
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suggests a principled explanation for these intuitions. In our view, the necessity of 
super-explanatory properties is not just some arbitrary conceptual quirk, but a 
natural consequence of the role that metaphysical modality plays in our cognitive 
economy.
One important aspect of metaphysical modality is the way it structures 
counterfactual thinking. Many everyday concerns call for us to consider what would 
have happened under some counterfactual supposition. When we counterfactually 
suppose that some item lacks some property, we naturally hold most of its other 
actual properties fixed. (Suppose Nixon had lost the election . . .) But when we 
counterfactually suppose that some Kind lacks a super-explanatory property, we are 
prevented from holding most of its other properties fixed, given that counterfactually 
supposing away a cause typically requires us to suppose away its effects, too. So 
when we suppose away the super-explanatory core of some Kind, all bets are off. We 
are hypothesing away all the many correlated properties that distinguish that Kind 
from others. The natural reaction is that we have thereby supposed away the Kind 
altogether.
We thus see how super-explanatory properties guide and constrain counterfactual 
thinking. Without such constraints, counterfactual suppositions could be developed 
in virtually any way, and so become theoretically and practically irrelevant. 
Williamson 2007 similarly appeals to our “sense of how nature works” in reliable 
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counterfactual thinking. While he doesn’t speak in terms of essential properties, he 
stresses the role of background knowledge of “constitutive facts” for correctly 
developing the supposition in a counterfactual conditional.  For Williamson, we can 
generally trust our capacity for assessing counterfactual conditionals to deliver the 
correct answers because it is informed and constrained by such a knowledge of 
“constitutive” facts. Our account here agrees with Williamson’s and importantly 
further clarifies what those constitutive facts are —namely facts about essential 
super-explanatory properties—as well as why they have such a special status in 
counterfactual thinking (cf. Mallozzi ms.; Vaidya and Wallner 2018).
Note that nothing in our account rules out possible worlds where a liquid with the 
superficial properties of water (odourless, colourless, tasteless, and so on) is not H2O, 
and ones where a species with the superficial properties of tigers (striped, solitary, 
carnivorous, and so on) are not descendants of the original tigers. But that liquid 
would not be water, nor that species tigers, precisely because their correlated 
properties do not stem from the same super-explanatory source as in the actual 
world.  We don’t count them as the same Kinds, despite their superficial 
resemblance, because they have been put together in a different way. They don’t 
have the crucial property that pulls together the categories that exist in the actual 
world.
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Before proceeding, it will be helpful to add some precision to our arguments. We 
have on occasion drifted into talking of super-explanatory properties of Kinds, and of 
Kinds possessing those properties in all possible worlds. But it is not strictly the Kinds 
themselves that have the super-explanatory properties, but their instances; and 
correspondingly what’s strictly necessary isn’t that the Kind has the essential 
property, but that any instance of the Kind does. Thus:
(1) (K)(E)(x)((K is a Kind, and E super-explanatory with respect to K)  
nec (Kx  Ex)
There is also the converse implication:
(2) (K)(E)(x)((K is a Kind, and E super-explanatory with respect to K)  
nec (Ex  Kx)
Principle (1) says that any super-explanatory E is required for Kind membership 
across possible worlds. E is an “essential property”, in that you can’t belong to the K if 
you lack it.
Page 29 of 42
Cambridge University Press
Journal of the American Philosophical Association
For Review Only
30
Principle (2) say that any super-explanatory E is sufficient for Kind membership across 
possible worlds. E constitutes an “essence”, in that you must belong to the K if you 
have it.14
Note that it doesn’t follow from (1) and (2) that a property that’s essential to, or an 
essence of, some Kind must be essential to, or an essence of, the individuals that 
belong to that Kind. Having professional accreditation is essential to and the essence 
of being a medical doctor – necessarily you have the accreditation if and only if you 
are a doctor. But that accreditation is not essential to (and still less is it the essence 
of) individual doctors being who they are. Any doctor could have failed to be a 
doctor; indeed no doctor was always a doctor, and many doctors cease to be 
doctors.
9 Metaphysical and Nomological Modality
It has been put to us15 that super-explanatory properties do not really involve 
metaphysical modality, but only highlight certain aspects of nomological modality. 
14 Many theorists who are suspicious of Kind “essences” take it as definitional that they must 
be intrinsic properties (Hull 1965, Sober 1980, Wilson et al. 2007, Rieppel 2010, Häggqvist 
and Wikforss 2018). Similarly, essentialists like Mark Ellis also view historical essentialism with 
suspicion, suggest that historical essentialists “creatively revive the illusion of species 
essentialism” (Ellis 2011: 670). Given our view of Historical Kinds, we obviously think a 
meaningful sense of historical essentialism can survive these critiques (see also LaPorte 2017, 
Godman and Papineau forthcoming).
15 In particular by Graham Priest.
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After all, super-explanatoriness depends on nothing more than nomological relations 
between properties in the actual world, and so doesn’t have to be seen as taking us 
beyond actuality.
We agree that our account of Kind essences gives priority to the actual world. Super-
explanatoriness is fully determined by actual-world nomological relations. But we 
don’t think that this disqualifies it as an account of metaphysically modally essential 
properties. After all, super-explanatoriness involves a quite specific kind of 
nomological structure. It’s not just a matter of one property being nomologically 
related to another, as gas pressur , say, is related to temperature. Rather, it involves 
a given property being the common cause of a many other properties, and thereby 
explaining why those other properties are so tightly correlated together. 
Our proposal is thus not to eliminate modal Kind essences in favour of nomological 
necessity, but rather to reduce them to a specific kind of nomological structure. This 
structure is distinguished from causal-nomological structure more generally by 
featuring single common causes which give rise to many other properties in what we 
can call “one-to-many” causal networks. 
We are proposing that, whenever we find this one-to-many nomological structure 
characteristic of a super-explanatory property, then that property will be possessed 
in all metaphysically possible worlds. We take this to explicate the familiar notion of 
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the “nature” of things as the source of metaphysical necessity. In our view, we gain a 
better grip on this notion by equating it with the underlying cause of the many 
properties and behaviours that consistently co-occur in the instances of a Kind—
namely, the essence of the Kind as we understand it.
To drive the point home, note that it is a consequence of our view that modal Kind 
essences would stay fixed even in possible worlds where the relevant laws of nature 
were different. Even if variation in laws of nature meant that H2O were no longer 
odourless, colourless, tasteless, and so on, it would still be water. We might be 
explaining modal Kind in terms of actual-world super-explanatoriness. But even so 
our account clearly implies that these modal essences transcend nomological 
connections, by staying fixed even when the latter vary.16
In this sense, then, super-explanatory properties provide a kind of bridge between 
the actual world and the modal realm.17 Super-explanatoriness depends on nothing 
beyond a specific kind of casual role in the actual world. But the specific structure of 
this causal role shows how metaphysical necessity is tied to the nature of things and 
16 As it happens, we are not committed to the contingency of laws of nature. But it enough 
for our point that modal connections would come apart from nomological ones if the latter 
were contingent.
17 Vetter 2015 explores a different way of grounding modality in actual-world facts: her 
potentialism explains possibility in terms of potentialities of actual individual objects. For 
more on the relationship between potentialism and essentialist accounts of modality, see her 
“Essence and Potentiality” ms.
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so explains why super-explanatory properties remain invariant across all possible 
worlds.
10 Identity and Super-Explanatoriness
It has been put to us18 that the modal consequences of (1) and (2) follow directly 
from the necessity of identity, and therefore that super-explanatoriness in not 
needed to explain them.
The thought is that such identities as water = H2O, and tigerhood = being descended 
from the original tigers19, and so on, together with the necessity of identity, are 
themselves enough to ensure the necessary coextensiveness specified in the 
consequents of (1) and (2), without any help from the super-explanatoriness referred 
to in the antecedents.
We agree that the modal consequences of (1) and (2) follow from Kind identities like 
water = H2O, and tigerhood = being descended from the original tigers, together with 
the necessity of identity. But we think that such Kind identities are themselves a 
18 In particular by Paul Horwich and Stephen Neale.
19 Perhaps it would be better to frame these as generalized identities rather than as simple 
equalities between properties (cf. Correia 2010, Rayo 2013, Dorr 2016, Correia and Skiles 
2019). And ideally we should be more explicit about the types involved: for example, by 
equating being water with having the microstructure consequent on being composed of H2O 
molecules. Still, we trust that our simplifications will not affect our arguments.
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consequence of (1) and (2). We identify water with H2O specifically because this 
molecular structure is super-explanatory of the many shared properties of water. 
Because of this super-explanatoriness, we regard water and H2O as necessarily 
coextensive, and this then leads us to identify them.
After all, there are theorists who don’t agree that
(3) water = H2O. 
(Let us stick to water. Everything that follows in the section would apply equally to 
tigerhood.) These theorists reject an externalist account of the concept water, and 
instead hold that it refers to anything that satisfies such nominal requirements as 
odourless, colourless, tasteless, freezes at 0OC, etc. They allow that all the actual water 
is in fact H2O. But they see no reason why this property should have a privileged role 
in relation to the nature of the Kind water, at the expense of the properties by which 
we recognize the Kind. They thus maintain that 
(4) water = odourless, colourless, tasteless, freezes at 0OC, etc. 
and deny that (3) water = H2O.
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In line with this, they hold that it is by no means necessary that water is H2O, or 
indeed that H2O is water. They think that there are possible worlds in which water—
the odourless, colourless, etc. liquid—is not H2O, and worlds in which H2O is not 
water—the odourless, colourless, etc. liquid—due to different types of observers or 
different laws of nature.
Now, we of course think that these anti-externalists are wrong about water (and we 
would say the same about similar anti-externalist views about other Kinds). But the 
interesting question is why they are wrong. 
Note that nothing is extensionally amiss with their account. They will classify just the 
same actual liquids as water as anybody else. 
In our view, the reason for identifying water with H2O, rather than with odourless, 
colourless, tasteless, freezes at 0OC, etc, is precisely that H2O is super-explanatory with 
respect to water, in a way that the nominal features of water are not, despite their 
extensional adequacy. The identity (3) water = H2O is thus a consequence of the 
earlier principles (1) and (2), not some independent claim from which they follow. 
Because H2O is super-explanatory, we take it to be both necessary and sufficient for 
water across modal space, as in (1) and (2). And this is why we then identify water 
with H2O, as in (3), and not with any set of its more superficial properties. 
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A super-explanatory property of a Kind plays a special role. It is a single property that 
pulls together all the many other common features of the Kind. None of the Kind’s 
other nominal features have this role. They are simply effects of the common super-
explanatory core.
This is why we take super-explanatory properties to be modally required for Kind 
membership, as in (1) and (2). An instance with a super-explanatory property has the 
feature that actually causes all the other distinctive properties of the relevant Kind. 
And so possible (or indeed actual20) instances still count as members of that Kind, 
even if they lack some of the nominal features of the Kind. Conversely, if we posit an 
instance that has all the nominal features, but not the super-explanatory essence, it 
doesn’t count as a member of the relevant Kind. As we observed earlier, a liquid that 
was odourless, colourless, tasteless, etc., but was not H2O, would not be water, 
despite its superficial resemblance. The category would have been put together by 
hand, so to speak, rather than deriving its shared features from the core property 
that pulls them together in the actual world.
So, yes, once we are given such identities as water = H2O, and tigerhood = being 
descended from the original tigers, then it will follow that the properties that flank the 
20 In Kinds with generalizations that admit of exceptions, such as biological taxa, there will be 
real cases like this, like albino tigers without stripes. Here the knowledge that the instance 
still belongs to the Kind can inform our actual-world inductions as well as our counterfactual 
conclusions. 
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identity sign are necessarily co-extensional. But the reason for embracing these 
identities in the first place is precisely that the properties on the right-hand sides are 
super-explanatory essences.
11 Further Issues 
Many believe, following Fine 1994, that necessary truth across all metaphysically 
possible worlds is never brute, but always a consequence of essences. While this fits 
our account of necessities that depend on super-explanatory Kind essences, we are 
uneasy about trying to force all m taphysical necessities into the single mould of 
essence.
For a start, there is the necessity of logic itself. This is not the place to explore its 
basis, but there is no obvious reason to suppose that this will hinge on the essence 
of anything. Nor do we think that the necessity of identity itself is helpfully viewed as 
depending on essences, given the way it follows from nothing but the legitimacy of 
de re modal constructions.
Having said this, we do think that the idea of super-explanatoriness promises to cast 
light on a wider range of metaphysical necessities than just Kind essences. Ruth 
Millikan has observed that individual people, animals, and other persisting objects 
are akin to Kinds in a number of respects. If we think of the “instances” of any such 
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individual as its temporal stages, then these instances will share many distinctive 
properties, small subsets of which will typically suffice to identify the individual in 
question. Given this, we can view any persisting individual on the model of a 
historical Kind, with the shared features of its instances being super-explained by its 
origin, and elements of that origin—like the parents of people, or the material 
constitutions of lecterns—therefore coming out as essential properties.
It is worth noting how this further possible application of super-explanatoriness, 
while rendering certain metaphysical necessities non-brute, is at variance with Fine’s 
progamme of basing all metaphysical necessity specifically in essences. Since 
different persisting individuals sometimes have the same origin—think of identical 
twins—we can have different individuals with all the same essential properties, which 
means that these essential properties do not constitute modally sufficient essences 
for those individuals.
Still, these are issues for another time. In this paper we hope that we have at least 
done enough to show that super-explanatoriness is the right way to understand the 
metaphysically necessary properties of Kinds.21
21 We would like to thank Alexander Bird, Ned Block, Paul Boghossian, Michael Devitt, Julien 
Dutant, Jani Hakkarainen, Paul Horwich, Markku Keinänen, Muhammad Ali Khalidi, Boris 
Kment, Jaakko Kuorikoski, Jessica Leech, Tim Lewens, Matteo Mameli, Caterina Marchionni, 
Ruth Millikan, Stephen Neale, Daniel Nolan, Graham Priest, Jesse Prinz, Samuli Reijula, 
Jonathan Schaffer, Martin Smith, Nick Shea, Barry Smith, Michael Strevens, Anand Vaidya, 
and two anonymous referees for the Journal of the American Philosophical Association for 
helpful feedback and conversation.  
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